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Lyons persuades us that sleeping sickness was indeed the disease of colonialism.
Although endemic in small, isolated foci in the early colonial period, it increased in incidence
around the turn ofthecentury, becoming epidemic in someregions over thenextdecades. As in
other parts of Africa, the upheavals and social disruptions accompanying colonial conquest
produced ecological crises which affected all aspects oflife. Central to her interpretation is the
contention that these events disturbed the delicate ecological relations among humans, vectors
and disease-causing pathogens and thus constituted the determining factor of the epidemic.
Sleeping sickness was also a colonial disease in the sense that the colonial state's incessant
demands for labour and tax and its drive to restructure African society through a series of
restrictive administrative measures, undermined the health ofAfricans in a variety of related
ways. Labour migration, for example, introduced Africans to new diseases, while time spent
labouring on mines and plantations resulted in a decline in food production and thus in
nutritional levels within African societies. This in turn exacerbated existing stresses and
impaired resistance to disease. Political and social disruption in some regions also contributed
to the disturbance of a complex cluster of beliefs and practices which had constituted a
pre-colonial "public health" system.
As Lyons shows, many Africans' first encounters with Europeans and colonial medicine
were in the form of military-style sleeping sickness campaigns. The "manhunts", the
surveillance of African villages, enforced isolation, and the ineffective chemotherapy that
characterized the early campaigns, evoked intense distrust from Africans. Not surprisingly
these campaigns were often perceived as aggressive expressions ofcolonial power and as a kind
of biological warfare. Even after public health reforms were instituted to ensure African
co-operation after 1910, these measures were coupled with increasing controls over a wide
range ofAfrican social and economic activities. For many Africans, thus, the campaigns were
indistinguishable from other measures of social engineering.
Lyons situates sleeping sickness research and the "medicalization" of the region within the
wider history and politics of international tropical medicine. She also traces the influences of
nineteenth-century European epidemiological theory and public health practices and the way
in which these were hybridized in a colonial context. African attitudes to disease and curative
procedures and their responses to the campaigns were equally salient, she argues, in the shaping
ofthe much vaunted public health system. She takes care, however, to indicate that responses
to Western biomedicine and the public health measures varied from outright rejection to the
selective internalization and absorption of elements which were deemed to be efficacious.
Inevitably, perhaps, a book that attempts to do justice to the political economy and ecology
of the disease, the social and economic history of the region, the development of a colonial
medical service, social relations within African societies-and much more-must suffer from
some unevenness of treatment. Chapter 5, for example, dealing with tropical medicine and
imperialism in the early twentieth century, is disappointingly cursory. And, although later
chapters address the relationship between the medical profession in the metropole and the
colony in the later periods, the wider international and comparative colonial context tends to
disappear from view. But these are minor points. This is a rich, pioneering study which deserves
a wide, attentive readership.
Hilary Sapire, Birkbeck College, University of London
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The life of Ludwig Edinger seems typical of a particular sort of academic career in
Germany in the second half of the nineteenth century. Born in 1855 as the son of a Jewish
salesman, he studied medicine in Heidelberg and Strasbourg, where he worked with the famous
clinician Adolf Kussmaul. His brilliant contribution to various fields ofanatomy allowed him
to pass the Habilitation in 1881. Although Edinger tried to pursue a university career, he soon
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found out that, as a Jew, his aims were thwarted. Thus, he started working as a practical
neurologist in Frankfurt and built up a private anatomical laboratory in order to continue his
systematic and comparative studies of the brain. Only in 1914-four years before his
death-was his Neurological Institute incorporated into the new University and Edinger made
a professor.
Dr. Emisch's book is divided into two parts. The first deals with the biography, the second
with Edinger's scientific contributions, in particular with his attempt to establish a psychology
on anatomical grounds. The author is in the good position ofbeing able to base her story on an
unpublished autobiography of Edinger. Unfortunately, however, she restricts her historio-
graphical viewpoint to Edinger's narrative. Consequently, the reader gets the impression that
the historian does not know much more than her subject. She "believes" Edinger's remarks on
the medical faculties ofHeidelberg and Strasbourg, or on the status ofneuroanatomy in 1880,
instead ofcomparing them with other sources orwith secondary literature. It is also regrettable
that Dr Emisch did not compare Edinger's biography with those ofother Jewish intellectuals.
In the second part the author plausibly argues that Edinger regarded his anatomical research
as a service for psychology. The most important result of the book is that Edinger's
combination ofcomparative anatomy and ofstudies in animal behaviour made him one ofthe
early contributors to animal psychology. These passages are highly informative, but again one
would have wished she had compared Edinger's approach with similar works by Theodor
Meynert, Bernhard von Gudden, or Paul Flechsig. Despite these shortcomings the author has
directed our attention to a very important figure in late-nineteenth-century brain research.
Michael Hagner, Georg-August-Universitat, Gottingen
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Freud as a philosopher! Perhaps the old man would have been pleased. When he was a
student he admired Franz Brentano and understood the philosophical debates of his time as
well as any physician. Jerome Neu, a philosopher at the University ofCalifornia, Santa Cruz,
has put together this, the most recent volume in the "Cambridge companion to major
philosophers", series running from Aquinas to Spinoza (but including Marx and Foucault).
Neu, who has psychoanalytic training, has compiled a volume which truly serves as a
"companion" to Freud. Not exactly a source book, not exactly a historical introduction, it
provides in-depth essays on a series of topics which frame Freud's work. But he is not
considered as a philosopher in the narrow sense ofthat word, for todo that would be to destroy
the therapeutic dimensions of psychoanalysis and that Neu is unwilling to do.
Thus the only truly "philosophic" chapter is the last-David Sachs' answer to Adolf
Grunbaum's critique of the scientific claims of psychoanalysis-and it is very much the
exception. For, rather than seeing Grunbaum's presentation as part of a critical reception of
the scientificality of Freud's work beginning with the initial critiques in the late nineteenth
century and extending via Eyseneck to Grunbaum (and beyond), Sachs focuses with intense
philosophic scrutiny on Grunbaum's argument. Since this debate has been widely explored,
Sachs' contribution is an interesting, yet minor note to the discussion. Having appeared first in
The Philosophical Review in 1989, it is part of an on-going, rather technical dialogue which
should have been broader for this purpose.
Other reprints, including Neu's own chapter on "perversion", Carl Schorske's brilliant,
indeed classic, piece on the "psycho-archaeology" ofpsychoanalysis, and Richard Wollheim's
deservedly widely cited piece on Freudian aesthetics provide broadly focused, intelligent
overviews of the problems they address. They are inclusive rather than exclusive. However, in
the light ofrecent work, especially that ofWilliam McGrath, Schorske's best known student, a
piece on the young Freud and his interests-especially in philosophy-could have augmented
this aspect of the volume.
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